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MUNICIPAL HOME RULE IN NEW YORK
The case of Adler v. DeeganI recently decided by the New
York Court of Appeals again raises the troublesome question of
the scope of municipal home rule in that state. In November
*Editor's Note: We regretfully announce the resignation of Myer Dwight
Mermin from the office of Case and Comment Editor, to assist a member of
the faculty in the conduct of a research investigation. He will continue
to serve as an editor of the Journal.
1251 N. Y. 467 (1929).
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1923, the Home Rule Amendment - was adopted, and put into
effect the following year by the Enabling Act.- The cities were
thereby authorized to legislate on matters relating to the "prop-
erty, affairs or government" of the cities, and, at the same time,
the state legislature was forbidden to invade that sphere of gov-
ernment save by general laws applicable to all cities alike.
The amendment was the culmination of agitation for home
rule which started in New York in the seventies 4 and was aimed
at eliminating two existing evils. In the absence of special con-
stitutional provisions, according to the great weight of author-
ity, there is no inherent right of local self-government, munici-
palities possessing only those powers with which the legislature
specifically endows them. Cities were constantly obliged to
lobby at the state capitol in order to obtain power to perform
specific functions. With the rapid growth of the urban popula-
tion of the country, the legislature was soon so swamped with
2NEW YORK CONST. art. XII, as amended in 1923, N. Y. CoNs. LAWS
(Cahill, 1928 Supp.):
"Sec. 2. The Legislature shall not pass any law relating to the property,
affairs or government of cities which shall be special or local either in its
terms or in its effect, but shall act in relation to the property, affairs or
government of any city only by general laws which shall in terms and in
effect apply alike to all cities except on message from the governor declaring
that an emergency exists and the concurrent action of two-thirds of the
members of each house of the Legislature.
"Sec. 3. Every city shall have power to adopt and amend local laws
not inconsistent with the constitution and laws of the state relating t0
the powers, duties, qualifications, number, mode of selection and removal,
terms of office and compensation of all officers and employees of the city,
the transaction of its business, the incurring of its obligations, the prezenta-
tion, ascertainment and discharge of claims against it, the acquisition, care,
management and use of its streets and property, the wages or salaries,
the hours of work or labor and the protection, welfare and safety of per-
sons employed by any contractor or subcontractor performing work, labor
or services for it, and the government and regulation of the conduct of
its inhabitants and the protection of their property, safety and health.
The Legislature shall at its next session after this section shall become part
of the constitution provide by general law for carrying into effect the pro-
visions of this section.
"Sec. 4. The provisions of this article shall not be deemed to restrict
the power of the Legislature to enact laws relating to matters other than
the property, affairs or government of cities.
"Sec. 5. The Legislature may by general laws confer on cities such
further powers of local legislation and administration as it may from
time to time deem expedient."
3 N. Y. CoNs. LAws (Cahill, 1928 Supp.) c. Ga, § 11.
4 MCBAIN, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF MUNICIPAL HO.E RULE (1916) 8.
r Ibid. 15; 1 DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (5th ed. 1911) § 98, and
cases cited in note 3, pp. 156-161; Comment (1923) 71 U. OF PA. L. REV.
265. But see Metropolitan St. Ry. v. Tax Com'rs, 174 N. Y. 417, 431, G7
N. E. 69, 70 (1903) ; cf. Town of Pelham v. Village of Pelham, 215 N. Y.
374, 109 N. E. 513 (1915).
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these bills that many municipal projects were unnecessarily de-
layed. The result was that the laws relating to any one city
were usually in a scattered and chaotic condition.0 Furthermore,
as city franchises and contracts became of ever increasing value
a second evil appeared in that the cities became the mark of polit-
ical spoilsmen in the legislature. State control was employed
for temporary political advantage, against the best interests both
of the state and the municipality7
The object of home rule is thus to create a sphere of independ-
ent local government which shall be free from state controlV
The framers of both the amendment and the Enabling Act found
it expedient to confer home rule powers in vague general terms,
leaving to the courts the problem of deciding in each case whether
the subject matter relates to the "property, affairs or govern-
ment" of a city, or is a matter of state concern subject to special
state legislation. Obviously there are certain matters (such as
building laws, rapid transit, health, etc.) which are neither ex-
clusively of local nor of state concern, but partaking rather of
the nature of both. The court must nevertheless decide that any
particular matter is either the one or the other, although it has
been contended that such a division is impossible. 9 What test
is the court to apply? In Adler v. Deegan, Chief Judge Cardozo
(concurring), declares that the test is not whether it is pre-
dominantly a matter of local or of state concern, but whether it
is "substantially a matter of state concern." 10 Judge Lehman
(dissenting in the same case) contends that the test is "whether
the subject matter relates to the government of the city or its
affairs, or its property." 11
The phrase in question first appeared in the New York Con-
stitution of 1.894 which provided that special bills relating to
the "property, affairs or government" of a city must be referred
to the suspensive veto of the mayor of the city affected.12 Under
this provision a state liquor tax law based on local sales of liquor,
which created a classification of cities different from that pro-
, McGoldrick, Home Rule in New York State (1925) 19 Am. POL. ScI.
REv. 693, 695; MCBAIN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 10 et seq. For example,
in 1913 a brief digest of laws relating to New York City filled up thirteen
hundred pages of fine print.
7 See Ekern v. City of Milwaukee. 190 Wis. 633, 636, 209 N. W, 860, 861
(1926) ; McBAIN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 5, 6.
8 bid. 17; DODD, STATE GOVII'iNMENT (2d ed. 1928) 396. For a brief
discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of municipal home rule
see 1 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 1928) § 93.
9 McBain, The New York Proposal for Municipal Home Rule (1922) 37
POL. Sci. Q. 655, 668.
10 Supra note 1, at 490, 491.
1 'Ibid. 496.
12 N. Y. CoNs. LAws (Cahill, 1924) N. Y. CONST. art. XII.
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vided for by the constitution, was held not to require submission
to the mayors of the cities affected. 13 The control of rapid tran-
sit in New York City by the state was held to be proper on the
ground that it was a matter of state concern and not one relating
to the "property, affairs or government" of New York City."
The control of public utilities seems to have been excluded from
municipal control as being a matter of state and not local con-
cern.25 Similarly, making the borough of the Bronx into a sepa-
rate county,'6 and making the office of county clerk a salaried
one when the entire county was located within the city limits 'I
have been treated as not relating to the "property, affairs or
government" of a city. These decisions have been regarded as
controlling in cases arising under the Home Rule Act of 1924.
The first case to be decided under the latter act denied cities the
power to operate municipal bus lines.'5 The court held that the
23 Einsfeld v. Murray, 149 N. Y. 367, 44 N. E. 146 (1896).
'4 Admiral Realty Co. v. City of New York, 206 N. Y. 110, 99 N. E. 241
(1912). The Rapid Transit Act of 1891 applied to all cities having a
population of over one million. This act was held not to be a "special
city law" even though it was limited in effect to New York City. "It was
adopted not only for the benefit of cities, .... but for the public at large
and it confers broad powers including that of granting franchiscs. It is
a much more general law than contemplated by the provision."
's McAneny v. Board of Estimate, 232 N. Y. 377, 134 N. E. 187 (1922).
The legislature abolished the public service commission of the first dis-
trict and substituted transit commissioners for cities containing over one
million population. The statutes were upheld. "Rapid transit for the
city of New York has for many years been a matter of public interest,
affecting not only the people of the city but of the whole state. It has
generally been regarded as a state affair." Ibid. 393, 1004 N. E. at 1921.
It might be of interest to compare this case with Sun Publishing Ass'n. v.
The Mayor, 152 N. Y. 257, 46 N. E. 499 (1897). A constitutional provision
forbade any city to incur indebtedness except for a "city purpose." The
building of subways under state authority was held to be a "city pur-
pose" since they were being built for the general welfare of the inhabitants
of the city. See also, Matter of International Ry. v. Rann, 224 N. Y. 83, 120
N. E. 153 (1918). In Los Angeles Gas and Electric Corp. v. City of Los
Angeles, 188 Cal. 307, 205 Pac. 125 (1922), the court held that the manufac-
ture and sale of energy by a city was a "municipal affair." For the treat-
ment of public utilities in home rule states generally, see MCBR,%ix, op. cit.
supra note 4, at 671. For a discussion of home rule in California, see Com-
ment (1928) 16 CALIF. L. Ruv. 336; Graybiel, California Decisions on Mmi-
cipal Law (1923) 11 CALIF. L. REV. 73.
' 6 Unger v. Kennedy, 207 N. Y. 533, 101 N. E. 442 (1913).
'7 McGrath v. Grout, 171 N. Y. 7, 63 N. E. 547 (1902).
38 Browne v. City of New York, 241 N. Y. 96, 149 N. E. 211 (1925).
Section 34 of the act is interesting in this connection. "The enumeration
of specific powers by this chapter shall not operate to restrict the mean-
ing of a general grant of power contained in this chapter, or to exclude
other powers comprehended in such general grant." Section 31: "This
chapter shall be construed liberally. The powers herein granted shall be
in addition to all other power granted to cities by other provisions of law."
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cities were not emancipated from the power of the legislature in
respect to every matter touching the "property, affairs or gov-
ernment" of a city but only those touching it in one or more of
the ways enumerated in Section 11 of the Home Rule Act.",
Either this restriction was not intended by the legislature, or was
subsequently found undesirable, for in 1928 Section 11 was
amended so that the city was no longer restricted to the enumer-
ated powers.
20
The following brief survey of the cases decided since the en-
actment of the Home Rule Act of 1924 reveals the great difficulty
in judicial division of governmental functions between city and
state legislatures in the absence of adequate statutory guidance.
For example, once the officers and clerks of the five counties
within the city of New York had been included within the retire-
ment system for city employees, it was held in Schieffelin v.
Beriy,21 that the city could no longer regulate the system. In
Bareham v. Rochester,22 the city had amended its charter so as
to provide for the appointment and removal of its officials in a
manner contrary to that permitted by the state election law.
The objection that even in matters touching its "property, affairs
and government" the city could not legislate counter to a general
See Comment (1928) 6 TEx. L. REV. 497 on the power of home rule cities
in Texas to keep busses off the streets.
29 N. Y. CoNs. LAWS (Cahill, 1928 Supp.) c. 6a, § 11: "The local legis-
lative body of a city shall have power to adopt and amend local laws in
relation to the property, affairs or government of the city relating (italics
ours) to the powers, duties, qualifications, number, mode of selection and
removal, terms of office and compensation of officers and employees of the
city, the transaction of its business, the incurring of its obligations, the
presentation, ascertainment and discharge of claims against it, the acquisi-
tion, care, management and use of its streets and property, the wages or
salaries, the hours of work, or labor, and the protection, welfare and safety
of persons employed by any contractor or sub-contractor performing work,
labor or services under it, the government and regulation' of the conduct
of its inhabitants and the protection of their property, safety and health."
20 N. Y. CoNs. LAWS (Cahill, 1929 Supp.) c. 6a § 11: "Unless hereafter
restricted by the legislature under the provisions of section one, article
twelve of the constitution, the local legislative body of a city shall have
power to adopt and amend local laws in relation to the property, affairs or
government of the city including but not limited (italics ours) to the
powers, duties . . ." etc. continuing on as in the unamended §ection, supra
note 19. See also c. 363, § 34.
21243 N. Y. 603, 154 N. E. 623 (1926).
In McCabe v. Voorhis, 243 N. Y. 401, 153 N. E. 849 (1926), a local ordi-
nance forbade the adoption by the board of estimate of any resolution per-
mitting changes in franchises or operating that would result in increased
fare etc., without the consent of the city. The court held the ordinance
invalid as an unauthorized attempt to supersede state legislation, but
declined to decide that it was invalid in that it related to the "property,
affairs or government" of cities.
22 246 N. Y. 140, 56 N. E. 445 (1927).
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state law applying equally to all cities was disposed of on the
ground that the state law in question did not apply equally to all
cities, having been superseded as to certain cities by special laws.
Thus the charter was upheld. In Matter of the Mayor of New
York (Elm St.)23 it was held that the state could not by a special
law provide for the revival of actions, arising out of the condem-
nation of land for city streets, which had been barred by the
Statute of Limitations. The changing of a city's boundaries, on
the other hand, was declared in City of Newr York* v. Village of
Lazrence 24 to be a matter not relating to the "property, affairs
or government" of a city, since it involved not merely cutting
off land from one city but also adding that land to another.
The instant case tested the validity of the Multiple Dwelling
Law,23 which was passed as an ordinary bill by a two-thirds
vote of the legislature and not on an emergency message from
the governor.2 6 Its provisions were mandatory only in cities of
over 800,000 population, thereby being automatically confined in
its application to New York City. The act was upheld upon
the ground that it was a health measure, and therefore a matter
of state concern and not one affecting the "property, affairs or
government" of New York City.27
These decisions seem to cast some doubt on the very existence
of municipal home rule in New York. Do the cities have a
sphere of power over local matters independent of state control
as was intended by the framers of the amendment? The sphere,
if any, seems to be extremely limited, with the prospect of
further judicial restriction in the future. As Judge Lehman
(dissenting) pointed out in the instant case:
"If this statute is sustained, then it would seem that the legis-
lature may cover by special laws almost the entire field of the
23 246 N. Y. 72, 158 N. E. 24 (1927). An award of damages in favor of
A against the city of New York was held to be barred by the Statute of
Limitations. A state statute was passed which declared that any award of
damages resulting against a city in condemnation proceedings for the
widening of streets, and which had been declared to be barred by the
Statute of Limitations by a judgment "within one year last past" might be
revived. While in terms it dpplied to all cities, the limitation to "within
one year last past" was held by the court clearly to indicate that it did
not do so in effect.
In Schieffelin v. McLaughlin, 127 Misc. 56, 215 N. Y. Supp. 209 (Sup.
Ct. 1926), it was held that a state statute applying in terms to police
commissioners of all cities of the state, but which in effect could reach
but one, was invalid.
24 250 N. Y. 429, 158 N. E. 51 (1929). Cf. Unger v. Kennedy, mtpra note
16; McGrath v. Grout, supra note 17; Cuff v. City of Oakland, 1. Cal.
598, 56 Pac. 445 (1899) ; Miller v. Greenwalt, 64 N. J. L. 197, 44 At. 882
(1899).
25N. Y. CONS. LAWS (Cahill, 1929 Supp.) c. 37a.
26 Supra note 2.
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protection of the property, safety and health of the City of New
York and substantially exclude the government of the city from
that field." 28
While it is true that the cities are no longer required to await the
pleasure of the legislature before proceeding to deal with matters
deemed to be local, they do so under the risk of having the work
declared invalid by the Court of Appeals, on the ground that it
is not a matter affecting the "property, affairs or government"
of the city.29 Furthermore, the evil of legislative interference
in matters of municipal concern seems but slightly restricted.
Home rule appears to be undergoing a judicial curtailment rem-
iniscent of the warning of Chief Judge Cardozo in Matter of
thke Mayor of New York, where he declared:
"Home rule for cities adopted by the people with much ado
and after many years of agitation, will be another Statute of
Uses, a form of words and little else, if the courts in applying the
new tests shall ignore the new spirit which dictated their adop-
tion. The municipality is to be protected in its autonomy against
the inroads of invasion." 30
27 In Wisconsin, a city ordinance permitted a higher maximum height
for buildings than that permitted by the state law. "Though the height
of buildings in cities is of state wide concern under the rule that health
and safety regulations are for the people of the community at large, yet
the height of buildings in a particular community is a problem and affair
more directly concerning the inhabitants of that community than the
casual visitor, or the other parts of the state, and is therefore a local affair
of that community within the amendment." The validity of the ordinance
was sustained with a warning by the court that its view was not to be
taken as precedent. Ekern v. Milwaukee, 190 Wis. 622, 209 N. W. 860
(1916).
Cf. People v. Obier, 7 S. W. (2d) 219 (Ky. 1928); Niehaus v. State, 111
Ohio St. 47, 144 N. E. 433 (1924); Braugher v. Board of Public Works,
271 Pac. 487 (Cal. 1928).
In the instant case (Adler v. Deegan) the court concedes the power of
the city to make severer restrictions, considering the state law as declaring
"a minimum essential to decent health and living."
In New Jersey, a statute exempting tenement houses in cities bordering
the Atlantic Ocean from requirements applying to the same kind of tene-
ments inland was held to be void as not being a general law, despite the
fact that cities along the coast are mainly summer resorts. Board of
Tenement House Supervision of N. J. v. Mittleman, 141 Atl. 571 (N. J. L.
192&); (1928) 17 NAT. MUN. REV. '770.
28 Supra note 1, at 499.
29 That such fear is actual and not imagined is shown by the fact that
many cities, even in so-called home rule states, hesitated to enact zoning
ordinances until they obtained a legislative decree granting this power.
In the instant case Chief Judge Cardozo concedes that a "zoning law in
many of its features is distinctly a city affair," but the Multiple Dwelling
Act he considered as not being a zoning resolution. Supra note 1, at 485.
30 Supra note 23, at 76, 158 N. E. at 25.
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Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals now seems to place the pre-
sumption in favor of state control, influenced perhaps by an in-
stinctive distrust of municipal administration, or perhaps by the
pre-amendment disposit-on to deny cities the benefit of the doubt
when their powers were in question.31
In view of the predominant political nature of the problems
in allocating the business of government between city and state,
and the crowding of the calendar by ever increasing litigation,
the desirability of casting upon the courts the entire burden of
determining the scope of home rule may well be doubted. On
the other hand, any more specific enumerat:on of municipal
powers might prove too rigid to meet shifting conditions. Cer-
tain matters regarded as local with reference to one time and
place appear to be of state wide concern with reference to others.
The control of local traffic, for example, was at one time regarded
as being of purely local concern. Connecticut has recently
placed the control of traffic under state management, thus in-
dicating that this problem has become a matter of state con-
cern.3 -2 Public charitable institutions are rapidly being with-
drawn from city control in favor of county maintenance and
supervision ?3 Even where the statutory grant is broad and
general, flexibility as to a particular matter is apt to be lost once
the court has pronounced upon it.3'
The proponents of a specific enumeration of home rule powers
prefer predictability as to the extent of these powers to a gamble
for greater municipal freedom through uncertainty. = On this
basis a slight degree of flexibility might still be obtained by a
provision similar to that in the present constitutional amend-
ment, permitting the legislature to avoid the enumerated restric-
tions by a two-thirds vote following an emergency message from
the governor. 3 Neither of these devices, however, are calcu-
3 1 Keane, New York Home Rule Amecndmett in the Cottrt3, (1927) 2 ST.
JOHN's L. REv. 35, 36.
32 DoDD, op. cit. supra note 8, at 397. See also ibid. 399-402.
33Ibid
34 McGoldrick, op. cit. supra note 6, at 701.
35 McBain, Municipal Home Rule (1922) 37 Pot,. SMi. Q. 655, 656.
3G Gf. AICBAIN, supra note 4, at 672, and generally 656 to 684.
In New York, there was an attempted enumeration of certain powers
which had given difficulty in other jurisdictions.
Section 21 of the Home Rule Act [N. Y. CoNs. LAWs (Cahill, 1924) §
21] provides that no local law shall supersede a state statute now in force
or hereinafter enacted by the legislature, if such local law
(1) Removes or raises any limitation on the amount in which the city
may become indebted, or on the amount to be raised, in any one year by
tax for city purposes, or for any city purpose;
(2) Removes restrictions of laws as to issuing bonds or other evidence
of debt;
(3) Applies to or affects the maintenance, support or administration
19291
YALE LAW JOURNAL
lated to secure the full benefits of home rule. Under the cir-
cumstances, it would seem desirable that these powers should be
conferred in broad general terms and that the courts should be
liberal in their attitude toward such powers. Without such
liberality the purpose of the home rule amendment seems des-
tined to failure.
WHAT LAW GOVERNS THE VALIDITY AND ADMINISTRATIONl OF
TRUSTS OF PERSONAL PROPERTY?
The rules of the conflict of laws as to the validity of trusts of
personal property 1 created by will are usually said to have be-
come crystallized. The corresponding rules as to the validity
of trusts created by settlement or deed inter vivos are sometimes
said to be different, and generally admitted to be unsettled. It
would seem proper, therefore, in considering the validity of
trusts of personalty, 2 to deal separately with trusts created by
will and those created by an instrument inter vivos.
(5) Applies to or affects any provision of the labor law or the Work-
men's Compensation Law;
(4) Changes the number or term of office of the members of the county
board of supervisors chosen as such in such city under the official title of
supervisors;
(5) Applies to or affects any provision of the labor law or the Work-
men's Compensation Law.
(6) Changes any provision of the tenement house law;
(7) Applies to or affects existing powers of the state comptroller in
relation to auditing or examining municipal accounts or prescribing forms
of municipal accounting;
.(8) Applies to or affects any provision of law providing for the regu-
lation or elimination of railroad crossings at grade or terminal facilities
within the city;
(9) Applies to or affects any provision of law relating to the property,
affairs or government of a county or counties.
The amendment itself definitely excludes education from the home rule
grant, retains the courts under the jurisdiction of the state legislature, and
provides the dates for municipal elections.
1 This discussion will be limited to trusts of personalty, although in
a number of the cases discussed the property actually sought to be placed
in trust consisted of realty. In these cases, however, there were direc-
tions that the land devised or conveyed in trust was to be gold and con-
verted into money. By the application of the doctrine of .equitable
conversion, based on the fiction that equity considers as done that which
ought to be done, the courts in these cases considered the land as personalty
after the death of the testator, or the delivery of the deed, and purported
thus to give effect to the intention of the testator or grantor. For a
fuller discussion of the doctrine, see Fisher v. Banta, 66 N. Y. 468 (1876);
Loughborough v. Loughborough, 14 B. Mon. 441 (Ky. 1854); 3 POMEROY,
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (3d ed. 1905) § 1162; 2 PAGE, WILLS (1926) § 1178
et seq.
2 A court, faced with the problem of determining the essential validity
[Vol. 39
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"The validity of a trust of movables created by a will is
determined by the law of the testator's domicil." 3 This is
the statement of the American Law Institute. It treats the
validity of a testamentary trust of personal property as deter-
minable by the same rule as an ordinary disposition of personal
property by will. The rule of the Restatement will no doubt
be found descriptive of the actual result in many cases.' Can
it be fully supported in its present form?3
Where a testamentary trust of personalty is attacked on the
ground that it violates the rule of the forum against remoteness
of a trust disposing of personal property and involving extraterritorial
elements, must first determine by what standard to judge its validity.
Conceivably the rule to be applied may be the same as if the operative
facts connected with the creation of the trust had all occurred within the
forum. It seems unreal to deny that in every case, including conflict
of laws cases, the law which the court applies is its own law. Thik is
far from urging, however, that in every case the result that should, or
will, be reached by the court of the forum as to a trust involving extra-
territorial elements is the same as that which would be reached in the
absence of extraterritorial factors. For reasons of policy, the court of
the forum may in a given type of case consistently use as its standard
a rule identical with the rule that would have been applied by the courL
of another state where certain of the operative facts occurred, provided
all of the operative facts had occurred there (i. e., the local rule of
such other state). For clear expositions of this view, see Learned Hand,
J., in Guinness v. Miller, 291 Fed. 769, 770 (S. D. N. Y. 1923); Cook,
Recognition of "Massachusetts Rights" by Now York Courts (1918) 28
YALE L. J. 67. See also Cook, The Logical and Legal Barcs of the
Conflict of Laws (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 457; Lorenzen, Tcrritoriality, Piblic
Policy, and the Conflict of Laws (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 736.
Whenever for convenience the expression "the rule or law of a state,"
without more, is used in this discussion, it will be used to mean the local
rule or law of that state as distinguished from the conflict of laws rule of
that state.
3 CONFLICT OF LAWS RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1926) § 316. It is
now a firmly established principle that, as a matter of convenience, the
state of the situs of personal property will recognize that the rules of
the state of the testator's domicil at death control matters of inheritance
with relation to such property. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws (1927) 378.
'Hussey v. Sargent, 116 Ky. 53, 75 S. W. 211 (1903); Whitney v.
Dodge, 105 Cal. 192, 38 Pac. 636 (1894); Despard v. Churchill, 53 N. Y.
192 (1873); Roosevelt v. Porter, 36 Misc. 441, 73 N. Y. Supp. 800 (Sup.
Ct. 1901); Cross v. United States Trust Co., 131 N. Y. 330, :.0 N. E. 125
(1892); In re Aganoors Trusts, 64 L. J. Ch. 521 (1895); Fellows v.
Miner, 119 Mass. 541 (1876); Jenkins v. Guarantee Trust & Safe Deposit
Co., 53 N. J. Eq. 194, 32 Atl. 208 (1895); Temple v. Pasquotank County,
111 N. C. 36, 15 S. E. 886 (1892).
5 The cases which have raised a conflict of laws problem as to the
validity of testamentary trusts of personalty have been for the most part
cases in which the trust was sought to be upheld as a charitable trust,
or where questions of remoteness, or suspension of alienation, were involved.
It is proposed, therefore, to consider the accuracy of the rule of the
Restatement in the light of these classes of cases.
19291
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of vesting or suspension of alienation, if the trust is valid accord-
ing to the local law of the testator's domicil, it is firmly estab-
lished that the trust will be recognized as valid everywhere.,
So, too, testamentary trusts that the local law of the forum
would deem private trusts have been upheld if valid as chari-
table trusts by the law of the testator's domicil.T This doctrine
has been followed even where the forum is the state where the
property is situated and/or the state where the trust is to be
executed. Since the rule against perpetuities is properly a
domestic property rule, it may be urged that its restrictions
should logically apply to all property to be held within the
state." But the strong inclination of the courts to uphold trusts,
particularly charitable trusts, wherever poss-ble has led them
to disregard their local restrictions on alleged grounds of comity.
There is only occasional affirmative support for the position
of the Restatement, however, that if a testamentary trust of
personalty is invalid by the law of the testator's domicil, it will
be invalid everywhere.1° The issue has apparently rarely been
6Whitney v. Dodge; Hussey v. Sargent; Roosevelt v. Porter; Cross
v. United States Trust Co.; Despard v. Churchill, all supra note 4;
English v. McIntyre, 29 App. Div. 439, 51 N. Y. Supp. 697 (lst Dep't
1898).
Miller v. Douglas, 192 Wis. 486, 213 N. W. 320 (1927) is the only case
which the writer has seen purporting to hold that the validity of a
testamentary trust of personalty is governed by the situs of the property.
In that case the testator, in exercise of a power of appointment created
by a trust deed of the donor, devised in trust his share of the property
under the trust deed. The will was attacked as violating the rule against
perpetuities. The trust was upheld on the ground that it was valid by
the law of the situs of the property (also the forum). It does not appear
in. the opinion, however, where the domicil of the testator was.
7 Dammert v. Osborn, 140 N. Y. 30, 35 N. E. 407 (1893) ; United State3
Trust Co. v. Wood, 146 App. Div. 751, 131 N. Y. Supp. 427 (1st Dp't
1911).
8 It is obvious that the state of the situs of the property, particularly
where that state is also the place where the trust is to be carricd out,
has the power in this type of case to reject the rule of the testator's
domicil, if to apply it would violate its own local policy. If it upholds
the trust, it will, however, transmit the property to the testator's doniicil
for administration. Despard v. Churchill, supra note 4; Dammert v.
Osborn, supra note 7.
0 "The general principle . . . had its origin in that international comity
which was one of the first fruits of civilization .... It would be contrary
to the principles of common justice and right upon which the rule is
founded to permit a testamentary disposition of personal property valid
by the law of the domicil to be annulled or questioned in every other
country where jurisdiction was obtained over the property disposed of or
the parties claiming it, except for the gravest reasons." Dammert v.
Osborn, supra note 7, at 38, 35 N. E. at 409.
10 This is the rule given by the court in Temple v. Pasquotank County,
supra note 4, where a trust for the trustee "to distribute the principal
as her judgment may determine for the poor of said county" was held
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raised except by the rule against perpetuities. There are numer-
ous cases in New York involving the rule against perpetuities
which have clearly held that the trust would be upheld at the
domicil of the testator if it was valid as a charitable trust by
the law of the state where the charity was to be established.-1
Strangely enough, the cases in this country on this precise issue
seem to be limited to New York.12 The importance of the New
York rule, moreover, has vanished with the enactment there of
a statute which has been given the effect of restoring the com-
mon law rules as to charitable trusts. 1 Logically the New
York rule should be applied to the case, if it arises, of a private
trust which violates the rule against perpetuities of the state of
the testator's domicil, but not that of the state where it is to take
effect. 4 The New York cases suggest at any rate this qualifica-
invalid as to a charitable trust. It does not appear whether the trust
would have been valid, however, under the local law of the forum, which
was also the state where the trust was to be carried out. In Jenkins
v. Guarantee Trust & Safe Deposit Co., supra note 4, the question involved
was the capacity of the testator to dispose of the property for charity.
On that issue the case is square authority, since the testator would have
been capable by the local rule of the forum, which was also the state
of the situs of the property.
"1Hope v. Brewer, 136 N. Y. 126, 32 N. E. 553 (1892); Matter of
Sturges, 164 N. Y. 485, 58 N. E. 646 (lJ00); St. Johns v. Andrews
Institute, 191 N. Y. 254, 83 N. E. 981 (1908); Draper v. Harvard College,
57 How. Pr. 269 (N. Y. 1879) ; Mena v. Virnard, 124 Misc. 637, 207 N. Y.
Supp. 504 (Sup. Ct. 1925); Kurziman v. Lowy, 23 Misc. 80, 52 N. Y.
Supp. 83 (Sup. Ct. 1898); Kennedy v. Palmcr, 1 Thomp. C. 581 (N. Y.
1873); see Matter of Crum, 98 Misc. 160, 165, 164 N. Y. Supp. 149, 152
(Surr. Ct. 1916). Contra: Wood v. Wood, 5 Paige 596 (N. Y. 1836); Levy
v. Levy, 33 N. Y. 97 (1865); Bascom v. Albertson, 34 N. Y. 5S4 (1366).
The latter cases, however, have been clearly overruled. This exception
has sometimes attempted to be explained away by the statement that n
these cases the law of the domicil makes the validity of charitable trusts
depend upon the rule of the place where the trust is to be carried out.
This is mere verbiage, however, as the rule of the Restatement clearly
means to say that the local (as opposed to the conflict of laws rule) of the
testator's domicil governs validity.
12L It is rather striking, perhaps, that numerous as the New York cakes
are, in each one the domicil of the testator was New York. This would
not seem to be a material factor, however.
13 In Allen v. Stevens, 161 N. Y. 122, 55 N. E. 568 (1899), and Matter
of McDowell, 217 N. Y. 454, 112 N. E. 117 (1916), it was held that
New York Personal Property Law (1893) § 12 providing that a trust
should not fail for indefiniteness of beneficiaries or want of a trustee
removed these trusts from the operation of the rule against perpetuitier.
14 Although it is likely that the result would be the same if the trust
could be upheld as a private trust in the state where it is to be executed
the writer has seen no case of a testamentary trust in this country clearly
pas.ing upon the precise point. From a purely logical viewpoint, the
result in the case of a private trust should be the same as in the case
of a trust valid as a charitable trust, for the contention that the state
of the testator's domicil should not interpose its domestic [property]
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tion of the rule of the Restatement: whenever the state of the
testator's domicil passes a statute affecting the validity of testa-
mentary trusts of personal property which a court may fairly
construe as a domestic rule not intended to apply to trusts to
be carried out in another state, there is a likelihood that the
trust will be held valid if it can be sustained by the law of
the state where it is to take effect, even though it violate the
domestic rule of the testator's domicil.
1
The cases raising a conflict of laws issue as to the validity of
trusts. created by settlement or deed inter vivos are very few.
Section 315 of the Restatement of the Conflict of Laws is as
follows:
"The validity of a trust of movables created by settlement or
other transaction inter vivos is determined by the law of the
state in Which each item of the property is situated at the time
of the creation of the trust."
This view is strongly urged to be the proper one by most lead-
ing writers, including Beale," Goodrich,"7 and Wharton,18 on
rule against perpetuities to invalidate foreign trusts would seem to apply
equally to both private and charitable trusts.
There is a case in England, moreover, where a private testamentary
trust of a testator domiciled in England was valid according to the law of
Scotland where it was to be administered, but violated the English rule
against perpetuities. The trust was upheld. Fordyce v. Bridges, 2 Coop.
Ch. 326 (1848).
16 There is another group of cases often discussed in connection with
the validity of trusts, namely, a few cases involving the capacity of the
testator or settler to dispose of the property, and a large number of cases
involving the capacity of the trustee to receive the property. To the
writer both classes of cases would seem to involve issues that may be
distinguished from what may be called the intrinsic validity of the disposi-
tion. The courts have, however, treated the capacity of the trustee as
independent of the rule governing the intrinsic validity of the trust, and
have determined the question with reference to the law of the trustee's
domicil. Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 43 N. Y. 424 (1871); Catt v. Catt,
118 App. Div. 742, 103 N. Y. Supp. 740 (1st Dep't 1907); Matter of
Lang's Will, 9 Misc. 521, 30 N. Y. Supp. 388 (Surr. Ct. 1894); Matter
of Weekes, 85 Misc. 280, 146 N. Y. Supp. 1006 (Surr. Ct. 1914).
The capacity of the testator to dispose of property by will, on the
other hand, seems to have been considered as part of the intrinsic validity
of the disposition itself, and governed by the same law. One cannot
quarrel seriously with this view in the case of testamentary trusts, for
the result in any case will normally be to apply the law of the domicil
of the testator. Jenkins v. Guaranty Trust & Safe Deposit Co., supra note
4. But query what attitude the courts will take if they adopt the rule
of the Restatement, that the validity of trusts iner" vivos is determined in
accordance with the law of the situs of the property.
1 Beale, Equitable Interests in Foreign Property (1907) 20 HAv. L.
REV. 382, 394.
1' GooDRIcn, op. cit. s'upra note 3, at 360.
18 1 WHARTON, CONFLICT OF LAws (3d ed. 1905) 680 et seq.
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the ground that the modern tendency is to determine the es-
sential validity of all transfers of chattels inter vivos by the rule
at the situs of the chattel.19 The tendency in general is un-
deniable, and should logically, and it would seem on policy, ex-
tend to transfers in trust. The opposing theory is the old
doctrine of inobilia sequuntur personmm, that personal property
has no locality independent of the owner's domicil and that the
law of the owner's domicil should determine the validity of
every transfer or disposition made by the owner whether it be
inter vivos or by will.
In an early New York case a settlor, domiciled in New Jersey,
purported to make a present conveyance in trust of property,
part of which was personalty in New York, to take effect in the
future, subject to a power of revocation in the settlor. The
court assumed that the attempted disposition was invalid under
New Jersey law, and overruled a demurrer to a suit by a local
administrator of the testator's estate to recover the property,
although under the statute in New York 20 the trust would have
been valid.
The only other cases in this country which the writer has
seen passing directly upon the question of what law governs
the validity of trusts of personal property created by deeds inter
vivos have been concerned with the rule against perpetuities.
There have been two such cases in New York both expressly re-
jecting the rule voiced by the Restatement. In one of these, the
trust was upheld where it was admitted that a provision for
accumulation of income was not contrary to the law of New
Jersey, the domicil of the testator, although it violated the law
of New York, where the property was situated at the time the
trust was created, and where the trust was to be administered.21
In the other case, a trust which would violate the rule against
perpetuities of the state of both the settlor's domicil and the
situs of the property was upheld where it was valid as a chari-
table trust by the law of the state where is was to be adminis-
tered.2- There is, finally, a recent federal decision which pur-
ports to follow the New York view, but the case would seem
to be largely dicta on the point, since the trust was found to be
valid whether tested by the law of the testator's domicil or the
situs of the property.2 3
19 CONFLICT OF LAWS RESTATEDMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1926) § 277.
20 Sullivan v. Babcock, 63 How. Pr. 120 (N. Y. 1882).
21 Townsend v. Allen, 59 Hun 622, 13 N. Y. Supp. 73 (1891), aff'd,
126 N. Y. 646, 27 N. E. 853 (1891).
2 Robb v. Washington and Jefferson College, 185 N. Y. 485, 78 N. E.
359 (1906).
23 The defendant, an investment company incorporated in Mas-sachuEetts,
executed with the plaintiff, a New York corporation, a declaration of trust
in which the plaintiff was trustee. The trust property consisted of the
1929l
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So far as the decisions go, therefore, the rules as to the
validity of trusts inter vivos seem to be identical with the rules
as to testamentary trusts of personalty. The fact that the rule
is well established 24 in New York, moreover, is likely to have its
effect elsewhere. Though the rule suggested by the Restate-
ment would appear to be the more desirable, it is at least doubt-
ful that the rule will be generally adopted by the courts25
Assuming that a trust of personal property has been validly
created, a further problem in the conflict of laws may arise with
respect to the actual execution of the provisions of the trust
shares of various corporations and the beneficial interest was divided into
"collateral trustee shares" which were represented by certificates.
Creditors of the investment company questioned the validity of the trust, as-
serting that it violated the New York rule against perpetuities. The court
in a suit by the trustee for instructions held the trust valid. Liberty
National Bank & Trust Co. v. New England Investors Shares, 25 F. (2d)
493 (D. Mass. 1928); (1929) 27 Micn. L. RE v. 464.
24 The only case in New York which seems to have questioned this is
Peabody v. Kent, 153 App. Div. 286, 138 N. Y. Supp. 32 (2d Dep't 1912).
In that case the settlor, domiciled in Massachusetts, executed in New
York a trust deed whereby he conveyed in trust real and personal property
in Massachusetts, New York and elsewhere. The trust was to be adminis-
tered in New York also. The court assumed that an equitable conversion
took place, so that the rules governing personalty applied. The trustees sold
the land and took back a purchase money mortgage, which they sought to
foreclose against an assignee of the mortgagor. The defense was that the
original trust was invalid in violation of the New York rule against
perpetuities and that the trustees never acquired title. The court said
that the trust was invalid by New York law, but that a grantee could
not contest the title of his grantor. The case cannot, therefore, be con-
sidered more than dictum. The case was affirmed in 213 N. Y. 154, 107
N. E. 51 (1914), but the court expressly declined to pass on the validity
of the trust, saying that it was unnecessary to their decision.
25 Professor Beale in his writings has cited only two cases in nupport
of the rule he has constructed for the American Law Institute. One is
the case of Van Grutten v. Digby, 31 Beav. 561 (1862) ; and the other is
Viditz v. O'Hagan, [1899] 2 Ch. 569, which is quite similar on its facts
to the Van Grutten case, and follows it.
In that case, a woman entitled to property under an English trust
was engaged to marry a Frenchman. Before the marriage, a marriage
settlement with trust provisions was made in France, which was invalid
by French law, but which was valid under the law of England. The
court held that the validity of the settlement was determined by English
law. While it is true that England was the situs of the trust res, it
is equally clear that England was the domicil of the woman at the time
the settlement was executed. The case, therefore, would seem to be of
no weight on the issue for which it is cited by Professor Beale in his
article, op. cit. supra note 16, at 394.
Appeal of Fowler, 125 Pa. 388, 17 At]. 431 (1889) is also of little
significance, holding merely that a trust inter visos will not be held invalid




in determining, for example, what law governs the assignability
of the cestui's interest, the power of the cestui to terminate the
trust by compelling the trustee to transfer the property to him,
etc. It may be assumed that the intent'on of the testator, if
expressed or apparent, would ordinarily be controlling. The
difficulty arises where the testator's intention is not expressed
or apparent, or where the situation is one that the testator may
not, or could not, have had in mind. The state of the authorities
on so-called questions of administration in such a situation is as
yet very unsatisfactory, and the decided cases alone do not af-
ford an acceptable rationale, assuming even, as we shall, that
all questions of adm'nistration will be treated alike.
As between the situs of the property and the state with
which the trust is connected in virtually all other ways. it is
clear that the law of the latter state and not the law of the
situs will govern. -0 This is true even where the s'tus is also
the fortmn. Similarly, the law of the testator's domicil has
been held not to govern if the other factors relating to the
trust are centered in some other state, -8 although some courts
have declared that questions of administration should be de-
termined with reference to the law of the testator's domicil.
unless a different intention appears.2 9 Cases of the latter type
are few, however, and do not carry us far in predicting when,
2 mn Farmers' & Mechanics' Savings Bank v. Brewer, 27 Conn. 600
(1858), the trust was local to Connecticut except for one fact-r, namely,
that after the decease of the testatrix the trust fund was invested in stock
in New York banks. The question before the court was whether one of
the cestuis had by the will received an assignable interest. The court
held the interest assignable under Connecticut law, exprcusly rejecting the
contention of counsel that the New York rule should apply.
In First National Bank v. National Broadway Bank, 15G N. Y. 459,
51 N. E. 398 (1898), the situation was similar to that in the preceding
case except that New York was the forum as well as the situs of the
property. The court held the assignment valid according to Connecticut
law, although by the New York law the interest was unassignable.27 First National Bank v. National Broadway Bank, supn- note 26.
23 In Keeney v. Morse, 71 App. Div. 104, 75 N. Y. Supp. 128 (Ist Dep't
1902), the testator was domiciled in Rhode Island, the fund was in New
York, the trustees and the cestui were domiciled in New York, and the
trust was apparently to be carried out there. There was a judgment
creditor's bill endeavoring to reach, without an assignment, the income from
this trust fund. The court held that the law of New York governed, and
that the income could not be reached by judgment creditors as in Rhode
Island.
29In Lozier v. Lozier, 99 Ohio St. 254, 124 N. E. 167 (1919) the testator
was domiciled in Ohio, and made a will while temporarily in New York
leaving certain securities in trust to trustees domiciled in New Yorl;.
The domicil of the cestuis does not appear. The question before the court
was the validity of an attempted assignment by one of the cestuis. The
court held the assignment valid under Ohio law, although by New York
law the cestui's interest was inalienable. The case may perhaps be dis-
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as a matter of law, such a contrary intention will be held to ap-
pear.8 0
With respect to testamentary trusts the American Law In-
tinguished from Keeney v. Morse, supra note 28, if the domicil of some
or all of the cestuis was in Ohio, or at least not in New York. The court
said that the mere appointment of New York trustees did not show the
testator's intention to have the trust administered by that law, for, the
ultimate trustee was (the ultimate supervision of the trust was in) its
probate court. The reasoning seems somewhat spurious.
In Rosenbaum v. Garrett, 57 N. J. Eq. 186, 41 Atl. 252 (1898), the
other question of administration suggested above was involved. In that
case the testator was domiciled in Pennsylvania, the cestui and trustee
were both domiciled in New Jersey. A fund was placed in trust for the
use of the cestui, free from the control of her husband. The trust was
admitted to be an active trust by the law of Pennsylvania, but the cestui
claimed that it was a passive trust under New Jersey law which should
govern. The cestui sought to compel the transfer of the trust fund to
her, but the court dismissed the bill.
In Lanius v. Fletcher, 101 S. W. 1076 (Tex. 1907), the situation was
similar to the preceding case, except for the fact that by the law of the
testator's domicil the provision securing the property from the husband's
control was ineffective, whereas by the law of Texas, the forum, the
situs of the property, and the domicil of the trustee, the provision was
valid. The court assumed that the testator knew the local law of his
domicil, and since he would not do a vain thing, concluded that he clearly
intended Texas law to govern. The court was thus able to repeat the rule
of the Rosenbaum case, and yet hold that Texas law governed. It should
be borne in mind, however, that the result of the decision is also to give
effect to the testator's apparent intention to have the fund held free from
the control of the cestui's husband.
30 The cases set forth supra notes 26-29 seem to be the extent of the
decisions in this country involving conflict of laws as to questions of
administration. There is an Ontario case in point. In that case an
Ontario testator created a trust of movables valid by the law of his
domicil to the state of Vermont as trustee. It contained certain provisions
for accumulations invalid by the law of Vermont. Although the trust was
upheld, it was held that the period of enjoyment be accelerated according
to Vermont law. Parkhurst v. Roy, 7 Ont. App. 614 (1882). Other
cases are occasionally cited on this point which, carefully analyzed, raised
or decided no conflict of laws question. Such a case is Curtis v. Curtis,
185 App. Div. 391, 173 N. Y. Supp. 103 (1st Dep't 1918). It will be noted
also that all of the cases cited in the text are cases of testamentary trusts.
In Greenough v. Osgood, 235 Mass. 235, 176 N. E. 461 (1920), the donor in
an antenuptial trust was not domiciled in Massachusetts, but appointed
as trustees residents of Massachusetts, where the trust property, con-
sisting largely of realty, was located. The deed provided that the property
in certain contingencies should go to persons entitled to it by the laws
of Massachusetts. The court said that the intent of the donor was clear
that the personalty as well as the realty should be administered under the
laws of Massachusetts. The actual point before the court, however, was
whether it had jurisdiction to instruct the trustees on the matter of
whether a certain power of appointment had been properly exercised. The
court held that it had.
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stitute has adopted the view that" a testamentary trust of mov-
ables is administered according to the law of the state of the
testator's domicil at the time of his death, unless the will shows
an intention that the trust should be administered in another
state." 31 In a commentary it is stated that
.... if the testator appoints as trustee a trust company of
another state or a resident of another state who engages regu-
larly in the profession of administering trusts, presumptively
his intention is that the trust should be administered in that
state."
In many cases of testamentary trusts, no doubt, the admin-
istration of the trust will be held to be located at the testator's
domicil, since his estate will often be settled there. But the
word "administered" in the rule of the Restatement is ap-
parently used in a technical sense. The place where the trust
is to be "administered" is not necessarily the place where the
trustees will carry on the actual business transactions connected
with the trust. What factor or combination of factors other
than the appointment of a foreign trust company or a profes-
sional trustee will indicate the testator's intention to have the
trust administered elsewhere than at his domic:l when his will
fails to set forth expressly such an intention? There is no in-
dication.
As to a trust inter vivos, the rule of the American Law:
Institute is that it is to be administered according to the law
of the state "where the administration" of the trust "is lo.ated
by the deed or other instrument." - In the absence of express
indication by the settlor, however, the rule here, too, is one of
delusive certainty. If the administration of the trust may or
may not be located at the place where the busine-,s of the trust
is to be carried on, if it may or may not be at the state of the
settlor's domicil, the situs of the property, the residence of the
trustees, or that of the beneficiaries, what is to be the guide in
evaluating these factors or combinations of them?
Professor Beale in his statement for the American Law Insti-
tute may have merely rephrased his earlier suggestion that the
"seat of the trust," the place where it is to be "administered"
(apparently in the sense of "actually carried out"), should
govern matters of administration.33 His earlier expression seems
s' CONFLICT Op LAWS RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 192G) § 319.
32Ibid. § 318.
33 See Beale, Tie Progress of the Law (1920) 34 HV. L. Ii;v. 30, 52;
Beale, op. cit. supra note 16, at 395. It is suggested that a clear ca e iz
a bequest to a charity permanently lccated in another state.
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more suggestive, however, of an approach to the varying factors
in seeking to choose between them or combinations of them. It
would seem to apply with equal force both to testamentary trusts
and trusts interr-vivos.
Professor Cook has suggested that the rule which will work
most satisfactorily in the long run is the rule of the state with
which the trust seems to have the most substantial connection.
3'
Other writers have considered the earlier suggestion of
Professors Beale and Cook as fundamentally the same 5 It is
probably true that both theories would lead to the same result
in most cases.30 Either theory seems to explain fairly well most
of the decided cases. It still remains to be seen, however,
whether either suggestion will be adopted by the courts as a
working basis. A more definite statement at this stage of the
law's development can scarcely be ventured.
POWERS COUPLED WITH AN INTEREST
The problem of what constitutes a "power coupled with an
interest," although having to do with what is ordinarily con-
sidered to be a relatively simple situation, promises to survive
for some time to come. The courts have done little to clarify
the rule since it was enunciated by Chief Justice Marshall in
Hunt v. Rousmnanier,' which is usually cited not only where the
34 Note (1919) 19 COL. L. REv. 486, 488. Professor Cook was speaking
with particular reference to the matter of the alienability of the cestui's
interest. It is supposed that his view would be the same as to other
questions of administration so-called.
35 GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 3, at 361; Note (1925) 23 Micu. L. REv.
385, 386.
36 One writer in considering these suggestions has asked whether under
Beale's theory the domicil of the trustee would not ordinarily be the
place of business of the trust. Note (1925) 23 MicH. L. REV. 385, 386.
Undoubtedly the domicil of the trustee is a factor, but surely the mere
appointment of a foreign trustee (not a professional trustee or a trust
company) in a state is not of paramount significance.
The same writer considered the suggestions of Professors Beale and
Cook alike. But Professor Cook does not even consider plausible the con-
tention that the law of the trustee's domicil should goveril questions of
administration. See Note (1919) 19 COL. L. Rav. 486, 488, n. 11.
18 Wheat. 174 (U. S. 1823). The first case in the United States rais-
ing the question of the termination of such a power by the death of the
grantor was that of Bergen v. Bennett, 1 Cai. Cas. 1 (N. Y. 1804), in
which Chancellor Kent held that a power of sale in a mortgage was a
"power coupled with an interest" and was not affected by the death of
the mortgagor. It was Hunt v. Rousmanier, however, which proved to
be the foundation of later American cases. Rousmanier had given Hunt
a power of attorney to sell a vessel owned by Rousmanier, the power to
be exercised upon default in the repayment of a loan for which the power
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question concerns the effect of the graitor's death upon the
power, 2 but in many other situations as well," and with diverse
results. 4 This, no doubt, was to have been expectel, inasmuch
as the variable in the formula, the word "interest," has no pre-
cise meaning.
The recent case of Lane Mortgage Co. v. Ccalhaus I prompts
a re-analysis of the problem. Here the plaintiff in making a
construction loan to a building contractor was given a lease on
one floor of the building for the period of the loan and in addi-
tion was appointed agent to manage the building, with authority
to rent space, collect the rents, and apply them on the loan.
The agency was important to the plaintiff, since the building
contractor had only a leasehold interest in the land, subject to
forfeiture in default of certain conditions, which conditions would
be within the control of the plaintiff. The builder later sold his
interest to the defendant, who, although aware of the plaintiff's
position, nevertheless disputed its authority to continue to man-
age the property, asserting on familiar principles that the agency
had been revoked. The court enjoined interference, holding that
the plaintiff held "a power coupled with an interest."
If the case be regarded merely as, a refusal to allow a revoca-
tion during the life time of the grantor, it is not new," for
Marshall recognized that the power in question in Hunt v.
Rousmanier might not be revoked during the lifetime of the
grantor.7  But if the result is in effect to authorize the plain-
was given as a security. Rousmanier's estate was insolvent and Hunt
brought a bill to enforce the power. The court held that it was a mere
power of attorney given as security and while it could not be revoked
inter vivos, was revoked by the death of Rousmanier.
2 Knapp v. Alvord, 10 Paige 205 (N. Y. 1843); Merry v. Lynch, 68 Me.
94 (1878); Conners v. Holland, 113 Mass. 50 (1873); Glendenning v.
Western Union, 163 App. Div. 489, 148 N. Y. Supp. 552 (1st Dep't 1914).
See inf ra note 17.
3Ray v. Hemphill, 97 Ga. 563, 25 S. E. 485 (1895) (attempted revoca-
tion inter vivos); Pacific Coast Co. v. Anderson, 107 Fed. 973 (C. C. A.
9th, 1901) (third party not allowed to revoke); Adair v. Smith, 2.3 Ga.
App. 290, 98 S. E. 224 (1919) (assignee of agent allowed to enfurce).
See infra note 11.
IGrandin v. Emmons, 10 N. D. 223, 86 N. W. 723 (1901) (power of
sale in a mortgage not revoked by the death of the mortgagor). Contra:
Wilkins v. McGehee, 36 Ga. 764, 13 S. E. 84 (1891); cf. Adair v. Smith,
supra note 3. See infra note 11.
269 Pac. 672 (Cal. 1928).
G Bryan v. Ross, 214 S. W. 524 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919); Hitchens v.
Ricketts, 17 Ind. 625 (1861); Ray v. Hemphill; Pacific Coast Co. v. Ander-
son, both supra note 3.
7 "Where a letter of attorney forms part of a contract, and is a Fecurity
for money, or for the performance of any act which is d~emed valuable,
it is generally made irrevocable in terms, or, if not so, is deemed irrev-
ocable in law." Hunt v. Rousmanier, supra note 1, at 201.
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tiff to rent offices as agent for and in the name of the defendant,
rather than that of the grantor of the power, it goes beyond
the Hunt case.8 It would seem immaterial under the latter inter-
pretation whether the original grantor of the power continued in
existence or not. The situation Marshall thought impossible,
that of conveying title in the name of a deceased person, would
now be presented. The power would thus not only survive revoca-
tion inter vivos but might survive the death bf the grantor as
well, as it was given for the duration of the loan.
Discussion of the problem has usually taken the direction of
comparing the "interest," legal or equitable, held by the agent
in the thing with which the power was concerned in one case
with that in another., In the instant case the agent obviously
had notldng resembling a legal title to that portion of the build-
ing which was being managed20 The circumstance, that he held
a twenty year lease to one floor, would seem to have no bearing
on the question. The case in this regard compares with the
agent's lack of legal title in and to the vessel in HunMt v. Rom-
mrnier. To say that in one case the agent had an equitable in-
terest, while in the other he had none, a possible explanation,
seems a mere statement of the difference in result, without giving
any tangible reason for the difference.
While it is of course important to consider the facts giving
rise to a legal title or lack thereof, it is believed that there are
several other factors of equal, if not greater, importance which
ordinarily are not stressed. In the case of a complete sale, the
giving of a power of attorney in connection with the thing sold
is of course unnecessary. So with a gift, or an out and out assign-
ment whether gratuitous or for value. On the other hand a
conveyance, a bill of sale or an assignment to an employee to
hold subject to instructions from the principal, although it might
perhaps be said to give the agent legal title, would give no
8 Cf. Bryan v. Ross, supra note 6 (an attorney who was given a power of
attorney by his client to sue and remove a cloud on the title to land and
to whom there was assigned a two thirds undivided interest in the land
in litigation was allowed to intervene and recover his two thirds un-
divided interest in a suit by his client against a third party, a buyer of
the land with notice) ; Adair v. Smith, supra note 3 (an agent was found
to have a power coupled with an interest, which by the contract could be
assigned, and the assignee was allowed to enforce the power against the
grantor).
OSeavey, Termination by Death of Proprietary Powers of Attorney
(1922) 31 YALE L. J. 283; Lowndes, Powers Coupled with an Interest
(1898) 12 HARV. L. Rnv. 262; Note (1923) 37 HARV. L. REV. 253.
"' On a state of facts similar to the instant case such a power has
nevertheless been held to survive the death of the donor. Kelly v. Bower-
man, 113 Mich. 446, 71 N. W. 836 (1897); Stevens v. Sessa, 50 App.
Div. 547, 64 N. Y. Supp. 28 (2d Dep't 1900).
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privilege of sale after the death of the principal.', And it is
only by virtue of the doctrine of apparent authority or the rules
for the protection of bona fide purchasers that there would be
any power in the agent to sell after his principal's death. A
buyer aware of the facts would not be protected in relying upon
the agent's power as one "coupled with an interest." ' - And, in
this situation, it needs no citation of authority to show that the
principal may revoke the employee's power at will and demand
a reconveyance if that be necessary.13
A quite different question is presented, however, where the
"interest," whether it be by assignment, bill of sale, conveyance
or indorsement, has been given for security. Here the grantor
may not demand a reconveyance during his life time; " and, as
a power of sale or other power given in connection with such
a transfer may constitute an important part of the security, it
too may not be revoked inter riros.' The ground for this is
the equitable one, that to force the security holder to resort to
action for breach of contract would deprive him of the benefit
of his bargain. The remedy at law would be inadcquate-and
extremely difficult of administration.'" For the same reasons
"Profit to an agent by way of compensation for his services, even a
share of the proceeds of a sale or collection to be made by him, is not
a sufficient "interest" to make the authority irrevocable. Hartley and
Minor's Appeal, 53 Pa. 212 (1866); McMahan v. Burns, 216 Pa. 448, 65
Atl. 806 (1907); Taylor v. Burns, 203 U. S. 120, 27 Sup. Ct. 40 (1906);
Schilling v. Moore, 34 Okla. 155, 125 Pac. 487 (1912); Laux v. Iogl, 45
Mont. 445, 123 Pac. 949 (1912); McColgan v. Bank of California, 27.
Pac. 342 (Cal. 1929); Lynch v. Gagnon, 274 Pac. 584 (Cal. 1929); cf.
Roth v. Moeller, 185 Cal. 415, 197 Pac. 62 (1921); Adair v. Smith, -wpra
note 3; Bryan v. Ross, supra note 6.
12 Blackstone v. Buttermore, 53 Pa. 266 (1866) ; cf. Hitchens v. Richc-tth
supra note 6; Bonney v. Smith, 17 Ill. 531 (1356).
"3TIFANY, AGENCY (2d ed. 1924) § 86.
1 Supra, note 7.
s Ray v. Hemphill, supra note 3 (power of sale under a mortgage);
Marziou v. Pioche, 8 Cal. 522 (1857) (power to collect a debt); Pacific
Coast Co. v. Anderson, supra note 3 (power to collect rents and charges ) ;
Hudson Trust Co. v. American Linseed Co., 190 App. Div. 289, 180 N. Y.
Supp. 17 (1st Dep't 1920) (power to vendee to transfer stock); Morris v.
Hussong Dyeing Machine Co., 81 N. J. Eq. 256, 86 Atl. 1026 (1913)
(power to vendee to transfer stock).
Voting trusts are often held irrevocable as "a power coupled with an
interest." Thompson-Starrett Co. v. Ellis Granite Co., 86 Vt. 282, 84 AtI.
1017 (1912); Chapman v. Bates, 61 N. J. Eq. 653, 47 At. 638 (1900);
Smith, Limitations on the Validity of Voting Trusts (1922) 22 CoL. L. REv.
627.
16 Ray v. Hemphill, supra note 3; Frank v. Colonial .Mfortgage Co., 86
Miss. 103, 38 So. 340 (1905) ; Stevens v. Sessa, szvpra note 10; Hawley v.
Smith, 45 Ind. 183 (1873) (held that the contract remained but the power
terminated, causing the estate of the deceased grantor of the power to
respond in damages for breach of contract).
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the death of the grantor would not operate to revoke the power,
and this has always been recognized.17
There are other considerations, however, which must be taken
into account before any useful generalization can be made. A
good illustration of one of these may be found in the problems
raised by the assignment of receivables for security. Although
part of a security transaction and given in a form which has
always been considered to create an "interest," 28 an assignment
is none the less held ineffective as against the trustee in bank-
ruptcy of the grantor, should the assignee have failed to exer-
cise the required degree of dominion over the account3. 10 Thus,
it would seem, a power given to the assignee in such a transac-
tion would equally fail, due to the policy of protecting creditors
against secret liens. -0 In contract, the usual forms of security,
such as a mortgage, conform to this policy, at least in theory,
by the requirement of recordation. So with a conditional sales
agreement, and, in the case of a pledge, the requirement of
delivery serves the same purpose.
In a large number of security transactions where the creditor
1Thus a power of sale given to the pledgee by the pledgor does not
terminate on the latter's death. JoNEs, COLLATERAL SECURITIES-PLDG..
(3d ed. 1912) § 631; Knapp v. Alvord, supra note 2 (the principal gave full
control and possession of his business to an agent with power to sell and ap-
ply the proceeds to notes owing the agent and others) ; Hess v. Rau 96 N.
Y. 359 (1884) (stockbroker was held to have a power to continue to
borrow shares to indemnify himself after the death of his client on a
"short" transaction entered for the benefit of the client).
It seems to be unanimously so held in those states in which an ordinary
mortgage operates to vest a title in the mortgagee. Conners v. Holland,
supra note 2; 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) 2718.
The same result obtains in the majority of the so-called "lien theory"
states. JONES, MORTGAGES (7th ed. 1915) 1792; Jencks v. Alexander, 11
Paige 619 (N. Y. 1845); Reilly v. Phillips, 4 S. D. 604, 57 N. W. 780
(1894); Hudgins v. Morrow, 47 Ark. 515, 2 S. W. 104 (1886); Grandin
v. Emmons, eupra note 4. Contra: Wilkins v. McGehee, supra note 4.
A similar result is recogniz ed in a conveyance under a deed of trust
by way of security. More v. Calkins, 95 Cal. 435, 30 Pac. 583 (1892);
Frank v. Colonial Mortgage Co., supra note 16; Rogers' Heirs v. Watson,
81 Tex. 400, 17 S. W. 29 (1891). Contra: Gartland v. Nunn, 11 Ark.
720 (1851).
is Marziou v. Pioche, supra note 15; Pacific Coast Co. y. Anderson,
supra note 3; Shepard v. McNail, 122 Mo. App. 418, 99 S. W. 494 (1907)
(power to collect receivables; the delivery of the books of account to
the agent was pro tanto an equitable assignment of the accounts to the
agent and gave him such an interest in the accounts themselves as to
make his authority irrevocable by the death of the donor); see Glenn,
Book Accounts as Collateral (1926) 26 COL. L. REv. 809.
29 Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U. S. 353, 45 Sup. Ct. 566 (1925); Glenn, op.
cit. supra note 18.
20 For discussion see Note (1925) 39 HAzv. L. REv. 253; Note (1923) 23
COL. L. REv. 279.
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has been given something less than a pledge, a mortgage, an
assignment or other recognized form of security, courts have
sustained the creditor on theories of equitable lien, equitable
mortgage and equitable assignment. One of the best known
examples of such a holding is the case of Walker v. Brown.
2'
The defendant, in order to enable the firm of L. & Co. to borrow
money to take up notes which he had endorsed, loaned the firm
$15,000 worth of bonds on which they obtained the loan. Sub-
sequently the firm desired to obtain cred-it from the plaintiff, who
had knowledge of the foregoing facts. At the plaintiff's request
the defendant wrote him that all of the firm's indebtedness to
the plaintiff should be paid off before L. & Co. returned the bonds
to the defendant and that the bonds were at the risk of the
business. Before this indebtedness was liquidated, however, and
before L. & Co. failed, the bonds wcre returned to the defendant.
Th plaintiff brought his bill to have a lien in his favor enforced
on the bonds, which was granted,'22 the court saying:
21 165 U. S. 654, 17 Sup. Ct. 453 (1897).
22 Accord: Johnson v. Johnson, 40 Did. 189 (1874) (plaintiff and defnd-
ant each claimed title to the same land, and by agreement the defendant
was to sell and pay an agreed part of the proceeds to the plaintiff; specific
performance was decreed in the appointment of a trustee to sell): Ketchum
v. St. Louis, 101 U. S. 306 (1879) (defendant loaned its bonds to a
railroad which agreed to pay installments on principal and interet out
of earnings; the receiver of the road was not allowed to interfere); Sey-
mour v. Freer, 8 Wall. 202 (U. S. 1868) (principal advanced money to
an agent to buy land in the principal's name, develop and sell it for
their joint accounts) ; Bonner v. Cross County Rice Co., 113 Ark. 51, 167
S. W. 80 (1914) (same facts); Hawley v. Smith, qpea not, 16 (same
facts); Hennessee v. Johnson, 13 Tex. Cir. App. 530, 36 S. W. 774 (1896)
(same facts--called a power coupled with an interest); Pacific Coast Co.
v. Anderson, supra note 3 (power to collect rents and charges given as
security called an equitable assignment of the freights); Shepard v. Mc-
Nail, supra note 18 (power to collect receivables called equitable assign-
ment); Fourth Street Bank v. Yardley, 165 U. S. 634, 17 Sup. Ct. 439
(1897) (drawing and delivery of a check, where the drawer, which had
insufficient funds to settle a clearing house debt, told the payee that it
had $25,000 on deposit with its New York correspondent, and exhibited
a statement indicating this fact). For discussion of equitable assignment
of bank deposits see Comment (1927) 37 YALS L. J. 62G. Cf. Massachu-
setts Trust Co. v. McPherson, I F. (2d) 769 (C. C. A. 1st, 1924).
In Earle v. Sunnyside Land Co., 150 Cal. 214, 88 Pac. 920 (1907),
where a void deed of trust, intended as security, -was sustained as an
equitable mortgage, the court said at 228, 88 Pac. at 925: "The form of
writing is not important, provided it sufficiently appears that it v.as
thereby intended to create a security. If that intention appears, it will
create a mortgage in equity or a specific lien upon the property so in-
tended to be mortgaged."
The reasoning in Knapp v. Alvord, supra note 2 and note 17, goes far
to show that Chancellor Kent would have been willing to rest the decision
upon the existence of an equitable lien upon the property which he was
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"Every express executory agreement, whereby the contract-
ing party sufficiently indicates an intent to make some particular
property, . . . or fund therein . . . identified, a security for
debt, ...or whereby the party promises .. .to transfer the
property as security, creates an equitable lien .. ." 23
This intermediate ground is one in which growth may be ex-
pected as new and different security transactions arise to meet
commercial needs, as in the instant case.24 And, for the reasons
which induce a court to sanction these transactions, it may be
said that an incidental power would also be sanctioned. 2- It
should be fairly clear from this that the bare inquiry, whether
a power is one "coupled with an interest" or not, is practically
fruitless. The entire setting of the case must be examined. It
seems probable that a close reading of the cases will show that
there is no separate category of "a power coupled with an inter-
satisfied was created by the clause in the power authorizing the sale of
the property and the application of the proceeds to the payment of the
notes secured. The court said at 209: "As the possession of the property
was delivered to Meads in connection with this power to dispose of it for
the security and protection of himself and the other endorsers, the pro-
perty must be considered as pledged to him for that purpose. The power
to sell, therefore, was coupled with an interest in the property thus
pledged and survived."
23 Walker v. Brown, supra note 21, at 664, 17 Sup. Ct. at 457.
24 The contract between the plaintiff and the building contractor read
in part as follows: "For the consideration aforesaid and as part of the
same transaction said Hotel Company (building contractor) does hereby
appoint and employ said Lane Mortgage company its sole and exclusive
agent for the management of said building. . . with full power and author-
ity to collect all rentals thereon and pay all operating expenses, taxes, . . .
interest on bonds, and bonds as they mature out of the money collected ...
it being understood and agreed that the agency and employment aforesaid
shall be irrevocable . . .until all of said bonds are paid . . ."
25 Merry v. Lynch, supra note 2 (agent authorized to sell the principal's
goods and out of the proceeds pay liens and other claims and apply the
balance to the payment of notes held by the agent); Glendenning v.
Western Union, supra note 2 (lessee sold half interest in his business and
gave an irrevocable power of attorney to conduct the business, sell or
assign the lease as security for money loaned); Shepard v. McNail, supra
note 18; Citizens State Bank v. Tessman, 121 Minn. 34, 140 N. W. 178
(1913) (a check was drawn against uncollected funds and then through
collusion it was sought to stop payment on the uncollected check) ; Gulf,
Colorado & S. F. Ry. v. Miller, 21 Tex. Civ. App. 609, 53 S. W. 709
(1899) (power given to an attorney to settle a damage suit and a half
interest in the amount recovered in consideration for past services) ; Dur-
brow v. Eppens, 65 N. J. L. 10, 46 Atl. 582 (1900) (power to manage
a fund given by a number of subscribers in an underwriters association) ;
see also Norton v. Whitehead, 84 Cal. 263, 24 Pac. 154 (1890); Dick v.
Page, 17 Mo. 234 (1852); Hitchens v. Ricketts, supra note 6; Allen v.
Davis, 13 Ark. 28 (1852).
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est" not revocable by death of the grantor, apart from the se-
curity situation.26
It may be hazarded that the above considerations operated to
bring about the result reached in Hunt v. RowsaZnier, although
it must be conceded they were not given as the basis for the
decision. When the cause was brought to be tried the estate
was insolvent, and the real contest was recognized as being one
between creditors. The plaintiff had elected not to take a mort-
gage, a form of security which the court would have recognized,
but a power of attorney which did not require recording. If
the same cause were presented today the result would no doubt
be the same, but not because the power was not one "coupled
with an interest"-or because it would be impossible for an
agent to convey title in the name of a deceased principal, the
other reason advanced-but because it would not be desirable
to recognize such a security as against other creditors of the
insolvent estate.
In the instant case the power appears to have been recorded.
It was one which anyone investigating the title to the real estate
could be expected to find. There would therefore seem to be
little ground for urging that it constituted a secret lien so as to
be void against creditors, assuming the recording acts were de-
signed to protect such creditors. If that is one of the principal
considerations to be taken into account before validating a trans-
action of this character, there would seem to be little doubt but
that it should be sustained, even in the event of the dissolution of
the grantor. Of course it would be possible to insist that the
lender should have taken a general lease of the property, rather
than a mere power to manage, but it is believed that the court
was justified in not requiring this additional formality.
EFFECT OF UNNECESSARY AFFIRMATIVE PLEADING UPON THE
BURDEN OF PROOF
The burden of proof I is usually said to be upon the party who
has "the affirmative of the issue as determined by the plead-
26 The power of a trustee to act after the death of the settlor is, of
course, not considered here. Likewise the various powers creatcd by
statute must be considered on a separate footing. The power of officers
of a corporation to continue to act after the death of a sole stockholder,
although not usually spoken of as a case of principal and agent, is to
be considered on still a different basis.
I"Burden of proof" as used herein refers to the "risk of non-persuasion"




ings." 2 From this are developed the corollaries that one does
not have the burden of proving a negative, 3 and that one setting
up an affirmative defense (in the sense of an abatement or a con-
fession and avoidance) has the burden of proving the same.,
Cases show, however, that one does frequently have the burden
of proving a negative,5 and that the connotation of "affirmative
defense" is not clear." It is often said that the burden of proving
a particular issue is upon the party to whost case the fact is
essential. 7 This rule has not proved very helpful because the
inquiry is simply shifted to determine the essential facts of
one's case." An additional test is to place the burden upon the
party who presumably has peculiar means of knowledge enabling
him to disprove the fact if it is untrue., But this rule is ignored
as often as it is followed. 0 Manifestly none of these rules
affords a universal test. They are used, it seems, merely as
vehicles for the application of ideas of fairness in particular
types of cases.1 Since the underlying factors are unstable, in-
exact, and undefined, it is not only impracticable but undesirable
to attempt to formulate a single test for locating the burden.12
Under the "affirmative pleading" test considerable difficulty
has been experienced with the situation where facts which could
have been shown under a general denial were affirmatively al-
leged. The decisions on this question are in conflict. The Su-
preme Court of Texas has held, in an action against an alleged
fraudulent vendee to cancel a deed, that an affirmative plea that
the defendant was an innocent purchaser for value (provable
under a denial) carried the burden as to that issue.13 Similarly,
2 2 CHAMBERLAYNE, MODERN LAW OF EVIDENCE (1911) § 943.
3 2 CHAMBERLAYNE, op. cit. supra note 2, § 949.
4 Mansfield v. Mallory, 140 Iowa 206, 118 N. W. 290 (1908).
5 The most frequent example is that of a promisee alleging non perform-
ance of a contract. Amos v. Hughes, 1 Moo. & R. 464 (1835); Mississi-
newa Min. Co. v. Andrews, 22 Ind. App. 523, 54 N. E. 146 (1899).
6 Starratt v. Mullen, 148 Mass. 570, 20 N. E. 178, 2 L. R. A. 697 (1889),
where it is said, at 571, 20 N. E. at 179: "Undoubtedly many matters
which if true, would show that the plaintiff never had a valid contract,
must be pleaded and proved by defendant; for instance, infancy, cover-
ture . . . ; where the line should be drawn might differ . .. in different
jurisdictions."
7 Dickinson v. Evans, 6 Term Rep. 57 (1794); Kohlsaat v. Parkersburg
& M. Land Co., 266 Fed. 283, 11 A. L. R. 686 (C. C. A. 4th, 1920).
8 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 2486.
9 Kittles v. People, 221 Ill. 221, 77 N. E. 472 (1906).
10 For instance, where a plaintiff is suing for defamation charging him
to be living in adultery, the burden is not on him to prove that he is law-
fully married. See 5 WIGMORE, le. cit. supra note 8.
11 Cf. 5 WiGbiR, op. cit. supra note 8, § 2486, where it is said that the
authorities in this field only justify the statement that, "There are special
rules for special cases, resting for their ultimate basis upon broad and
undefined reasons of experience and fairness."
12 5 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 8, § 2486.
13 Boswell v. Pannell, 107 Tex. 433, 180 S. W. 593 (1915).
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in an Idaho case a plea that the plaintiff's assignor, a foreign
corporation, had not complied with certain statutes so as to be
privileged to do business in the state was held to impose upon
the pleader the burden of proving the allegation, even though
the matter was provable under a demurrer.1 4 These holdings
indicate a slavish adherence to the mere form of the pleading."
Thus, the court in the former case, says:
"He set forth affirmatively this defense. It was therefore in-
cumbent upon the court to charge upon it.... If this is a greater
burden than should have been rested on defendant, the reply
is that it is the burden which the defendant voluntarily as-
sumed." 16
A great majority of the jurisdictions in which the question
has arisen have repudiated the above view.17 The fact that in
an action on a contract the defendant has affirmatively set up
his version of the agreement, as is often the case, does not affect
the location of the burden of proof.' Nor is the burden changed
by pleas that the contract has been rescinded and a different one
made ;19 that money sued for was delivered in part payment for
14Kiesel v. Bybee, 14 Idaho 670, 95 Pac. 20 (1908).
15 2 CHAMBERLAYNE, op. cit. supra note 2, § 949.
.6 Boswell v. Pannell, supra note 13, at 440, 180 S. W. at 596. Cf. Kiezel
v. Bybee, supra note 14, at 675, 95 Pac. at 22, where it is said: "By
pursuing this method of raising the question . . . the defendants neces-
sarily assumed the burden of proving that fact."
17 Grash v. Salter, 6 Iowa 301 (1858) ; Stewart v. Ashley, 34 Mich. 183
(1876); Huston v. Ticknor, 99 Pa. 231 (1881); Bishop v. State, 83 Ind.
67 (1882) ; Eastman v. Gould, 63 N. H. 89 (1884); Isaac Leisy & Co. v.
Jaish Zuelling, 7 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 423 (1885); Farmers Loan & Trust
Co. v. 8iefke, 144 N. Y. 354, 39 N. E. 358 (1895); Whitlatch v. Fidelity
& Casualty Co., 149 N. Y. 45, 43 N. E. 405 (189G); Wylie v. Marinofsky,
201 Mass. 583, 88 N. E. 448 (1909); Davidson Fruit Co. v. Produce Dist.
Co., 74 Wash. 286, 134 Pac. 510 (1913); Walters v. Battenfield, 21 N. M.
413, 155 Pac. 721 (1916); Figeaud v. Jones, 39 S. D. 40, 162 N. W. 738
(1917); Poindexter v. Call, 182 N. C. 366, 109 S. E. 26 (1921); Yazoo &
M. V. Ry. v. Levy & Sons, 141 Miss. 199, 100 So. 525 (1925); see Millis v.
Barber, 1 M. & W. 425, 427 (1836); Abrath v. N. E. Ry., 11 Q. B. D.
440, 457 (1883). Also, see cases cited inzfra notes 9 to 14 inclusive.
18 Puget Sound Iron Co. v. Worthington, 2 Wash. Terr. 472, 7 Pac. 886
(1885); Homire v. Rodgers, 74 Iowa 395, 37 N. W. 972 (1888) (action to
recover excess collected for pasturage; the plaintiff alleged that defend-
ant had misrepresented the price he was to get, contending that it
was 40¢ per head per month; the defendant set up that he was to get
$2.00 per head for the time his pasture was used; held, that the burden
was on the plaintiff); Williams v. Ninemire, 23 Wash. 393, 63 Pac. 53
(1900) ; Peterson v. Seattle Traction Co., 23 Wash. 615, 63 Pac. 539 (1900).
'19 Mott v. Baxter, 29 Colo. 418, 68 Pac. 220 (1902) (no written plead-
ings; stenographer's suit for wages; the defendant testified that the con-
tract terminated on a certain date and that the plaintiff continued to
work from that date under a new and different contract; held, that it
was reversible error to charge that the burden of proving that the old
contract had terminated was on the defendant).
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stock and not as a loan; 20 nor even in a code state, by the fact
that the allegations are set out as new matter,2 or appear in
a replication. 22 The basis of these rulings has been clearly
stated:
"A statement of facts by way of defense which are merely
inconsistent with those stated by the plaintiff, is, in effect, a
denial. It is not new matter. It admits nothing. It simply
contradicts. . . . This being the effect of the testimony of de-
fendant, the defense thereby interposed . . . must be treated as
a denial ... because that defense [general denial] permits ...
any and all facts which tend to negative the averments... which
a plaintiff is required to establish." 23
Under this view a misdirection as to the burden of proof is not
"invited error." 2- However, the allegations are impertinent and
Will be stricken upon motion, 25 and will fall before a demurrer21
And furthermore if the pleadings mislead the other party,2' or,
in addition, form a part of a cross complaint, 2s their form will
determine the location of the burden.
The situation in some jurisdictions is doubtful. Two cases
in Connecticut have allowed the form of the pleadings to control
the location of the burden,29 partly because of an assumption
that, as the affirmative form was used to make the defense ap-
20 Schmitz v. Mathews, 133 Wash. 335, 233 Pac. 660 (1925).
21 Walters v. Battenfield, supra note 17.
22 Yazoo & M. V. Ry. v. Levy & Sons, supra note 17 (action to recover
for destruction of cotton shipped on the defendant's road; answer, that
the defendant was entitled to a set off to the extent of insurance that tho
plaintiff had collected according to the bill of lading; replication, that for
specified reasons the bill of lading was inoperative in that respect; held,
that the burden of proof as to that issue was on defendant) ; Fox v. Hil-
liard, 35 Miss. 160 (1858).
23 Mott v. Baxter, supra note 19, at 420, 68 Pac. at 221; cf. Homire v.
Rodgers, supra note 18, at 599, 37 N. W. at 974, where it is said: "Now,
the burden was on plaintiff to prove his averment, and its establishment
would necessarily prove the falsity of defendant's claim. But if the burden
was on defendant to establish the truth of his claim, . . .it follows that
the plaintiff was relieved of the burden of proving his allegation."
24 Schmitz v. Mathews, supra note 20. The court says: "But this is not
an invitation to the trial court to commit error; it is merely an opportun-
ity." Ibid. 336, 233 Pac. at 661.
25 See Puget Sound Iron Co. v. Worthington, supra note 18, at 483, 7
Pac. at 887; Williams v. Ninemire, supra note 18, at 400, 63 Pac. at 536.
20 Petersvii v. Seattle Traction Co., supra note 18.
27 See Yazoo & M. V. Ry. v. Levy & Sons, supra note 17, at 212, 106 So.
at 527.
28 Ruby v. Clammer, 69 Colo. 329, 194 Pac. 360 (1920).
29 Coogan v. Lynch, 88 Conn. 114, 89 Atl. 906 (1914) (action to recover
money alleged to have been advanced to the plaintiff's husband in his life-
time; answer, that the advance was intended and accepted as a gift);
Distin v. Brasley, 83 Conn. 466, 76 Atl. 991 (1910) (assault and battery;




pear stronger and more aggressive, it was only fair to impose
upon the pleader the burden of proving his allegations.3 On
the other hand, two cases in the same jurisdiction have affirmed
rulings which allowed the substance of the pleadings to control.'
The latest Connecticut case 32 also affirmed such a ruling but
hastened to add that a defendant would be in no position to
complain "in case the court takes him at his word and errone-
ously instructs the jury as to the burden of proof. This, how-
ever, not because the burden of proof is shifted, but because the
defendant cannot take inconsistent positions with the court." 23
Neither of these decisions attempts to distinguish any prior
inconsistent holding.
Similarly, the cases in Missouri do not seem to be in harmony.
In an action for the price of wheat sold, the answer alleged, be-
sides a denial, that the contract was for more than had been
delivered, specifying the amount. The defendant was held to
have the burden of proving his allegation.3 ' In a later case,3s
brought to enforce payment for digging a well, the answer al-
leged that payment was to be made only on condition that a
supply of water was secured. A refusal to charge that the de-
fendant had the burden of proving his allegaton was affirmed,
the earlier case being distinguished on the ground that the dis-
pute there concerned the existence of an entire contract and not
a mere term. A more recent case supports the latter decision30
It is submitted that the issue in both cases is simply which of two
versions of an agreement is true. In California a plea that the
contract sued upon had been rescinded and a smaller rate for
the plaintiff's wages agreed upon was held not to affect the
30 Coogan v. Lynch, supra note 29.
31 Ferrie v. Sperry, 85 Conn. 337, 82 Atl. 577 (1912) (action for damages
resulting from the defendant's inaccuracies in surveying a land line, and
for breach of warranty that it was accurate; answer: (1) denial; (2) a
"second defense" setting up the defendant's version of the contract for the
surveying); Miller v. Pierpont, 87 Conn. 406, 87 Atl. 785 (1913) (suit for
alienation of affections; answer: (1) denial; (2) that the plaintiff's vife
was employed by the defendant and was present at his house for such
reason).
32Vycas v. St. George Guard Soc., 97 Conn. 509, 117 Atl. 692 (1922)
(action for damages for wrongful expulsion from the defendant society;
answer: (1) denial that the expulsion was without notice, etc.; (2) "spe-
cial defense" elaborating the plaintiff's conduct and the manner of ex-
pelling him).
33 Vycas v. St. George Guard Soc., supra note 32, at 512, 117 Ati. at 693.
34 Church v. Fagin, 43 Mo. 123 (1868); ef. Rivers v. Glass Co., 81 1Mo.
App. 374 (1899) (answer alleged that the money sued for was deposited
with the defendant to be paid over to the plaintiff on a condition which
had not been fulfilled).
35 Hull v. Cooper, 36 lo. App. 389 (1889).
36 O'Shea v. Lehr, 182 Mo. App. 676, 165 S. W. 837 (1914) (answer:
denied the loan sued for and alleged that the money was received as part
payment on a note). See Stephens v. Fire Assn. of Phila., 139 Mo. App.
369, 373, 123 S. W. 63, 66 (1909).
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location of the burden' 7 while, in a later case, a plea to a quan-
tum meruit count that the work was done under a special con-
tract was held to place upon the defendant the burden of prov-
ing his allegation, sa the court saying that the doctrine of the
prior decision would be carried no further. Some early Ken-
tucky cases also seem to be in conflict31
The problem herein discussed frequently arises in connection
with the right of opening and closing the argument, since this
right is thought to follow the burden of proof.40 Here, no case
has been found which makes the mere form of the pleading
the test of who has the burden. Instead, the cases are unani-
mous in ruling that the affirmative of the issue in substance is
the test.41 This view as to the effect of the form of pleadings
on the location of the burden seems more reasonable, for other-
wise the matter would "quite as often [be] regulated by the
dexterity of the pleader, as by the real nature of the controversy
between the parties." 42 Furthermore, the whole trend of modern
procedure is distinctly opposed to any rule which penalizes one
for mere formal errors in pleading.
37 Scott v. Wood, 81 Cal. 398, 22 Pac. 871 (1889): "The fact that the
traverse was affirmative, and not purely negative, in form did not destroy
its force nor change its essential nature .... The issue though lamely
made up, was the same, in substance, as if it had been made up with ab-
solute precision." Ibid. 404, 22 Pac. at 873.
3S Pendleton v. Cline, 85 Cal. 142, 24 Pac. 659 (1890).
3 Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Barnes, 30 Ky. L. Rep. 1290, 101 S. W.
301 (1907) (form of the pleading held to be controlling); Louisville &
Nashville Ry. v. Welsh, 13 Ky. L. Rep. 732 (1892) (substance hold to
control).
40 Degan v. Tufts, 8 Kan. App. 338, 56 Pac. 1126 (1899). See cases
cited infra note 41.
41Sharp v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 124 Md. 130, 91 Atl. 753 (1914),
Ann. Cas. 1916 D 954 n; McLees v. Felt, 11 Ind. 218 (1858); Amos v.
Hughes, 1 Moo. & R. 464 (1835) (assumpsit for breach of a contract to
emboss calico in a workmanlike manner; plea: that defendant did emboss
the calico in a workmanlike manner); Soward v. Leggatt, 7 Car. & P.
613 (1836); Beecher v. M'Intosh, 8 Car. & P. 720 (1839); Chambers v.
Hunt, 18 N. J. L. 339 (1841); Ashly v. Bates, 15 M. & W. 589 (1846);
Note (1903) 61 L. R. A. 513, collecting cases; BEST, RIGHT TO BEGIN AND
REPLY (1886) § 5 et seq.; GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE (16th ed. 1899) § 74. In
Teller v. Ferguson, 24 Colo. 432, 51 Pac. 429 (1897), the answer alleged
that the money sued for was, according to the contract, to be paid to the
plaintiff's father. The court said at 436, 51 Pac. at 43: "The defendant
claims that this answer was framed for the purpose of giving him the
opening and closing of the case, but the substance and effect of the issue
is more to be regarded than the mere form of the pleading."
42 Amos v. Hughes, supra note 41, at 465n.
